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Rosetta Stone Ltd. respectfully submits this ieply brief in support of its motion for partial 
summary judgment as to liability_ For the reasons that follow, Rosetta Stone's mot ion should be 
granted. 
INTRODUCTION 
Rosetta Stone establ ished that it is entitled to summary judgment as to Ilability because 
there are no genuine issues of material fac[ as to Google 's violations of the Lanham Act and 
Virginia law: 
• Google is directly liable for trademark infringement because Google uses the ' 
Roserta Stone Marks l in .E. maWler that is likely to confuse - and in fact has 
. confused - consumers. 
• Google is liable fo r the trademark infringement of its customers 'because (i) it 
in~entionally induces its customers to infringe the Rosetta Stone Marks, (ii) it 
continues to · sell Sponsored Links to entities that it knows are engaging in 
trademark infringement, and (iii) it has the legal right and practical ability to stop 
the infringing conduct yet fa ils to do so. 
o Google is liable for trademark dilution because its conduct has resulted in the 
blwring and tarnislullent of the Rosetta S!one Marks. 
e . Googie has been unjustly enriched because it knowingly uses and sells the Rosetta 
Stone Marks for its own profit without compensating Rosetta Stone. 
In its efforts to avoid summary judgment. Google overstates Rosetta Stone's claims, understates 
its own conduct, avoids the elements of trademark infringement and urges the Coun to simply 
ignore the overwhelming evidence which establishes thar confusio n arises from Google' s sale of 
·the Rosetta Stone Marks as keywo rds. As discussed below, notwithstanding Google's attempts 
to blur the matters before the Court, app lication of governing law to the undisputed facts compels 
the conclusion that Rosena Stone is enritled to summary judgment as to liability. 
The "Rosetta Stone Marks" include ROSETTA STONE, ROSETI A STONE LANGUAGE 
LEARNING SUCCESS, ROSETT ASTONE.COM and ROSETI A WORLD. 
6506 
ARGUMENT 
l. ROSETTA STONE a>;.s PROVED DlRECT TRA.DEMAK'C LIABILITY 
To prove a claim for direct infringement, Rosetta Stone must demonstrate that (I) it 
possesses the Rosetta Stone Marks; (2) Google used the Rosetta Stone r..,larks; (3) GoogIe's use 
of the Marks occurred in commerce; (4) Google used the: Marks in connection with the sale, 
offering for sale. distribution, or adverti5ing of goods and services; and (5) Google used the 
Marks in a manner likely lO confuse consumers. 15 V.S.C § 1114; PETA ". Doughlley, 263 F.3d 
359, 364 (4thCir. 2001). 
A. Google Does Not Dispute That The First Four Elements Of A Trademark 
Infringement Claim Are Met 
Google does not dispute that the first four elements are met here. Nor could it. 
Numerous courts have held that Google's sale of trademarks as keywords constitutes a use in 
corrunerce in connection with the sale, offcriJ1g for sale, distribution, or advertising of goods and 
services. See. e.g., Rescuecom Corp. v. Google Inc., 562 F.3d 123 (2d Cir. 2009); Goagle. [nc. v. 
Am. Blind & Wal/paper, No. C 03-5340 JF (RS), 2007 WL 1159950 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 18,2007); 
GEICO v. Google. Inc., 330 F. Supp. 2d 700 (E.D. Va. 2004). 
B. The Record Evidence inmoDstrates That Google Uses The Rosetta Stone 
Marks In A £\1anner Likelv To Confuse Consumers 
The only open issue with respect to trademark infringement is whether Google used the 
Rosetta Stone Marks in a manner likely to confuse consumers. See Rescuecom, 562 FJd at 130-
31 (stating that Lanham Act vio lation will lie if Google's use of trademark "in its AdWords 
program causes likelihood of confusion or mistaken and denying motion to dismiss where 
likelihood of confusion was sufficiently aUcged). Contrary to Google's assertion that Rosetta 
Stone has not met its burden, the record evidence establishes confusion in several ways. (See 
Dkt. 104, Rosetta Stano Mem. at 17-24.) 
2 
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1. Rosetta Stone Prooerlv Defi!led Its COilfus!on Barden 
First, Google argues that "Rosetta Stone's theory of direct liability against Google is 
premised on initial interest confusion.," which Google asserts is not actionable in this Circuit. 
(Dkt. 153, Opp'n. at 9-12.) Google's argumenr is flawe~ in two respectS. As a lh..Ieshold matter, 
the likelihood of confusion estabiisbed in Rosetta Stone's motion for partial summary judgment 
is not initial interest confusion but the likelihood that Google ' s use of the Rosena Stone Marks 
will "confuse an (ordinary consumer' as to the source or sponsorship of the goods.'" PETA, 263 
F.3d at 366. As explaincd below, Roserta Stone has carried its burden with respect to this issue. 
Accordingly, Google's interjection of the initial interest confusion theory is largely beside the 
In addition, while the Fourth Circuit declined to endorse the initial mtere..<:;t confusion 
theort ir! Lamparello v. Falwell, it has not rejected it. 420 F.3d 309, 316-18 (4th C~. 2005). In 
fact, the Lamparello court discussed at some length initial in[eres~ confusion, expJaining that the 
doctrine applies only in cases involving "one business:s use of another's mark for its own 
fmancial gain" and therefore would provide no basis for liability in the case before it. Id. at 317. 
In analyzing cases that have adopted the doctrine, the Lamparello court recognized tbat the 
appellate courts "have only applied it to profit-seeking uses of another's mark" whereas "the 
district courts have not so limited the application of the theory." Id. at 318 n.6. The court stated 
its view that the district court cases "were wrongly decided," but did not criticize or question the 
appellate court decisions. Thus, while Lamparello declined (0 endorse the initial interest 
confusion doctrine on the facts before it, the court's analysis leaves open the question whether 
Indeed, notwithstanding Google's statement at page 9 that Rosetta Stone's theory of direct 
liabili ty is premised on initial interest confusion, Google subsequently statcs that "the 
confusion ar issue in this case is confusion as to source of goads.': (Opp'n at 18 u.S .) 
3 
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the doctrirle applies to cases, such as this one, where the defendant uses the plaintiff's mark for 
its own flIlancial gab. 3 As the Fourth Circuit recognized, numerous courts have adopted the 
doctrine in such circumstances. See Lamparello, 520 F.3d at 317 (citing PACA.AR Inc. v. 
Telescall Teehs. , L.L.c. , 319 F.3d 243, 253 (6th Cir. '2003), and Promalek Indus., Lid. \'. 
Equitrae Corp., 300 F,3d 808, BI2 (7th Gir. 2002)]; see also Playboy Enters., Illc. v. NelScape 
CommC1T's Corp., 354 F.3d 1020, 1024-25 (9th Cir. 2004) (applying initial interest confusion 10 
claim by markholder against internet search engine thai: sold pla intiffs mark as a keyword to 
third parties); GEICO v, Google, Inc., No. 1:04GVS07, 2005 WI.. 1903128, at *4 (E.D, Va. Aug. 
8, 2005) (applying initial interest confusion to claim by markholder against Gocgle based on 
Google 's sale of plaintiffs mark as a keyword to third panies). 
2. Coofusion Is Presumed As A Matter Of Law 
Google also argues that confusion cannot be presumed because the presumption of 
confusion that arises when a defendant lnlenl ionally copies a protected mark applies only «where 
the defendant intentionally copies the plaintiffs mark for its use on its own competitive products 
with the intent to confuse or deceive the public." (Opp'n at 12.) Noither of the cases cited by 
Google supports such a limited view of this presumption. Shakespeare Company v. Sf/star 
Corporation of America expressly states that the presumption arises "when the copier intends to 
exploit the good will created by an already registered trademark." 110 F.3d 234, 237 (4th Cir. 
2007) (quotation omitted). Here, the record demonstrates that Google intended to exploit the 
goodwill created by the Rosetta Stone Marks (and ali other trademarks) in 2004 when it 
In Carl v. bernardjcarl.com, 662 F. Supp. 2d 487 re.D. Va. 2009), the defendants did not use 
plaintiffs mark for their own financial gair. Rather they purchased a web domain bearing 
plaintiffs name and posted cOlTespondence at the domain in an attempt to communicate with 
the plaintiff. Id, at 491. 
4 
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. ~ 
affIrmat ively' decided to pewjt its customers to bid on the Marks and then again in 2009 wh~n it 
affrrmat iv.ely decided to permit certain customers to use the Marks in their Sponsored Links. 
(Ok!. 104, Undisputed Facis ("UF'') 16-17,24-25.) In Anhellser-Busch, Inc. v. L&L WilIgs, inc. , 
the court held the presumption inappropriate where the. defendant used plaintiffs mark for the 
purpose of parody. 962 F.2d 316, 32 1-22 (4th Cir. 1992). Google, of course, is no t using the 
Rosetta Stone Marks for parody and its reliance on such case law is misplaced. 
Google then rejects as :'i.napplicable" all the cases cited by Rosetta Stone on the ground 
that they involve either competitors or counterfeiters. (Opp'n at 12.) Goog!e misses the point. 
The fact that "Google does not provide competing or counterfeit goods," (id.), does not change 
the fact Ihat Google displays on its search-results pages Spor..sored Links for counterfeit goods 
and allows those Sponsored Links to use Rosetta Stone Marks as k.eyword triggers and m their 
tex.t. Such Sponsored Links are presumptively confusing. See Phillip lv/orris US.A., Inc. v. 
Shalabi, 352 f. Supp. 2d 1067, 1073 (C.D. Cal 2004) ("[ejounterfeit marks are inherently 
confusing."); Cucci Anl, Illc. v. Duty Free Apparel, 286F. Supp. 2d 284, 287 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) 
('lejounterfcits, by their very nalure, cause confusion."); Fila U.S.A .. Inc. v. Kim, 884 F. Supp. 
491,494 (S.D. Fla. 1995) (same). 
Google, moreover, completely ignores the two other circumstances in which confusion 
will be presumed, both of which are present here: (i) using identical marks in the same 
. geographic area for the same class of goods or services and (ii) using a domain name that is 
identical to someone else's trademark. (See UF 10-17, 19,24,28, 35-37.t 
, 
Although Google purports to address the use of the Rosetta Stone Marks "in post-domain 
URL addresses," (Opp'n at 13- 14), it completely ignores the undisputed fact that many of the 
Sponsored Links displayed by Google contain the Rosetla Stone Marks in their actual 
domain names. (UF 35.) Moreover, although Google asserts that the use of marks in post-
domain URL addresses is functional and serves orJy to identify a u!,\ique internet address 
. -~ 
5 
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In short, Google has not sufficiently rebutted the presumption of confusion th"t arises 
from its use of the Rosetta Stone Marks. 
3. Google's Use Of The Rosetta Stone Marks Result, In A Likelihood Of 
Confusion 
Finally, Google argues that Rosetta Stone has nor demonstrated that Google'5 use of the 
Rosetta Stone Marks results in • likelihood of confusion. (Opp'n at 14-23.) Google's analysis, 
however is fatally flawed for several reasons. First, Google does not apply or even set tanh the 
nine-factor test utilized in this Circuit to assess likelihood of confusion. instead, without citation 
to a single case, Google applies a three-factor test consisting of "intent of actual confusion [sic], 
intent, and consumer sDphistication." (Id. at 14.) 
Second, Google's analysis is improper because Google presents its Sponsored Links in 
isolation and out of context. For instance, in addressing purported "ads for genuine ,goods," 
Google separately addresses cherry-picked examples of Sponsored Links for reseUers, 
competitors, informational sites and sites unrelated to language education. (Id. at {5-24.) 
Google thus frames the confusion question in a piecemeal fashion that has no relation to the 
reality ofwhat appears on Google's search-results pages or Google's practices as a whole. 
Indeed, the cases cited by Google do nol support its myopic approach and instead require 
that the Court analyze Google's conduct in context. In CareFirst of Nfaryland, Inc. v. First (:'are, 
P. C . the Fourth Circuit stated that it must "examine the allegedly infri.nging use in the context in 
which it is seen by the ordinary consumer." 434 F.3d 263,271 (4th Cir. 2006). The Court thus 
(cont 'd from pre"'ious pag~) 
(Opp'n at 13-14), its own website states that "[t]he display URL path does not have to be a 
functioning page of your actual website." (Dk!. 149, 4/9ilO Spaziano Ex. 44.) Google even 
advises its customers to make up a post-domain display URL to "complement your ad's 
message" by, for example, "highlighting the brand name." (Id.) 
6 
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concluded that it was not per.nissibie to simply look at the maks themselves; it had to look at the 
mnrks "in th~ marketplace." fd. Likewise, in Johnson & Johnsoll Vision Care, inc. v. 1~800 
Contacts, 1nc., the court stated that "a COUrt must analyze the message conveyed in full context" 
and "must view the face of the Slatement in. its entirety, rather than examining the eyes. nose, and 
mouth separately and in isolation from each other." 299 F.3d 1242, 1248 (llth Cir. 2002) 
(quotations omined); see also Lamparello, 420 F.3d at 316 (determining likelihood of confusion 
requires "examining the allegedly infringing usc ;'1 the context in ..... ,hich it is seen by the ordinary 
cO/1Sumer") (quotation omitted) (emphasis in original). 
The entire premise of"Goagle's presentation thus is fundamentally flawed - the Court 
may not look at each Sponsored Link out of context, but must consider Google's practices as a 
,,,·bole. Indeed, Google's Opposition is based on the faulty premise that Rosetta Stone merely 
challenges specific Sponsored Links that appear on Google's search-results pages. While many 
of these Sponsored Links ceJ1ainly do infringe the Rosetta Stone Marks, and help establish 
GoogJe's liability for trademark infringement, what -Rosetta Stone is challenging is Google's 
practice of selling the Rosetta Stone Marks to third parties to use as keyv.'ords and in the content 
of their Sponsored Links, and then displaYL'1g those Sponsored Links when a user queries a 
Rosetta Stone Mark. In this regard, Rosetta Stone does not dispute that rescUers, affiliates, 
competitors and informational sites can, in some circumstances, lawfully refer to Rosena Stone . 
. (See Opp 'n at 15-1 8.) However, Google's practice of allowing an third parties to bid on and use 
the Rosetta Stone Marks is impermissible as it results in a likelihood of consumer confusion. 
Vvben Google's practices are properly considered in context. ;:here can be no question that 
likelihood of confusion has been establisned. Rosetta Stone has established actual confusion, 
which both parties agree is "of paramount importance" and "th:: best evidence" of likelihood of 
7 
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, 
confusion. COPP·I'. at IS.) C--oogle's own internal studies d-emonstrate that internet users a.re 
confused (i) by Sponsored Links as consumers frequently cannot distinguish between Sponsored 
Links and organic search results; and (ii) by the use of trademarks ;'1 Sponsored Link text. (UF 
18,20.) Google does not - because it cannot - dispu[e these findings. (Opp 'n at 18-19.) As to 
the former studies, Google staies without any suppon that confusion between organic and 
Sponsored Links has "nothing to do wit~ whether users are confused as to the source or origin of 
Rosetta Stone's products." (Id. at 18 lLS.) Such assertion flies in the face of Goagle's clail"ns 
that its organic search engLl1e identifies the most relevant sites in response to a user query. A 
user who is "unable to differentiate [the top Sponsored Links] from organic search results," (UF 
18), necessarily believes that the top Sponsored Link is the top - i.e., most rcl~vant - organic 
search result. As to the latter studies, Google says that they are irrelevant because they did not 
address Sponsored Links using the Rosetta Stone Marks. (Opp'n at lB.) The conclusions 
rcached in those studies, however, were not mark-specific, and Googie, in fact, relied on the 
conclusions in deciding not to permit customers to use trademarks in Sponsor~ Link. text. (UF 
2 1.22.) Having based its 2004 policies on these studies, Google cannot now assert that they have 
no relevance to Google's practices. 
In addition to. the conf.lsion evidenced by Google's internal stuuies, Rosetta Stone 
present=d the testimony of Google's current and former Chief Trademark COUl1se! Terri Chen 
and Rose Hagan. At their depositions, each witness VIas presented with a Google search-results 
page for a search of "Rosetta Stone." Neither Google witness could tell that three of the 
Sponsored Links displa>-ed on the search-results page were not reseUers of genuine Rosena 
Stone software. (UF 43.) In response, Google asserts that these individuals cannot qualify as 
"actually confused" because Ro:s:e~a Stone has no evidence th<3t either is in Ihe relevant pool of 
8 
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, 
consumers. (Opp'n at 24 n.9.) Yet, Google itself asserts that "Rosetta Stone's target market is 
better educated and has higher income levels than the general U.S. population." (ld. a! 8.)5 
Undoubtedly, Ms. Hagan and Ms. Chen fall within this targe, market. In any event, if Gciogle's 
own Chief Trademark Counsel, who flrc well-versed in ~he use of trademarks, are confused as to 
the source of the goods advertised in Google's Sponsored Links, how can Google expect its users 
- irrespective of their level ofsophisrication - not to be confused? 
In fact, the record evidence:: demonstrates that Goog]e users indeed are confused as to the 
source of the goods advertised in Google's Sponsored Links. Five individual Consum~fs - each a 
coUege gr.aduare and two with advanced degrees - have testified that they were confused by a 
Sponsored Link displayed on a Google search-results page when they conducted a search for 
"Rosetta Stone," leading them to do business with companies that they believed were sponsored 
by Rosetta Stone and to buy what they thought was genuine Rosetta Stone product bur which, in 
fact, was counterfeit software. (UF 42.)6 Relying (In George & Co., LLC v. imagination 
Entertainment Ltd, 575 F.3d 383 (4th Cir. 2009), Gobgle asserts thar in assessing the weight of 
the testimony of ihese individuals, the court should consider the fact that "more than 
Google makes this stateme..'1t in its "Counter-Statement of Undisputed Facts." Rosetta Stone 
does not agree with Google's characterization oftbe facls set forth i.'1 this Counter-Statement 
and maintains that [hey are not relevant to the issues presented in this case. 
Conirary to Google's assertion, all five individuals purchased counterfeit product. Although 
Diana Stanley Thomas could not locate the software she purchased at the time of her 
deposition, she purchased the product from soureeplaza.com (Tbomas Dep. at 20:20-22), the 
same website from which Denis Doyle purchased his counterfeit software (Doyle Dep. at 
16:6-8). Moreover, although Steve DuBow could not confirm at his deposition where the 
link from which he purcbased counterfeit 50 ftware appeared, his records show that he 
purchased the software on October 6, 2009 from bossdisk.com(Dkt. 149,4/9110 Spaziano Ex. 
53 , DuBow Ex.. 2), a Sponsored Link about which Rosetta Stone complained to Googlc on 
October 6, 2009 (Dkt 149 ,4/9/10 Spaziano Ex. 43 ~t GOOG-RS-0310697). 
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100:000,000 Rosetta Stone ad impressions were served since 2004." (Opp'n at 22-23 .)7 
Hcwever, ''[W]ithOllt knowing how many, or what percent of, incidents go unreported, anecdotal 
evidence of confusion cannot usefully be compared to the universe of potential incidents of 
confusion. The rarity of such evidence makes e:ven a few incidents <highly probat ive of lhe 
likelihood of confusion.''' KDs Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Andrx Corp., 369 F.3d 700, 720 (3d Cir. 
2004) (quoting Checkpoint Sys., Inc.· v. Check Point Sofrware Tech , Inc., 269 F.3d 270, 291 Od 
Cir. 2001 » (rejecting argument that 60 reported incidents of confusion was too small a 
percentage of the approximatety 650,000 prescrip[ions); see also Sara Lee Corp. v. Kayser-
ROlher Corp., 81 F.3d 455,466·67 (4th Cir. 1996) ("[llndeed, we can but wonder how often the 
experiences related by the trial witnesses have been repeated - but not reported - in stores across 
the country."). S Moreover, contrary to Google's assertion, the "totality of Rosetta Stone's 
evidence" extends far beyond the testimony of these five witnesses (Opp'n a[ 23), and includes, 
as discussed above: Google's own studies, testimony and admissions. Rosetta Stone has 
established actual confusion. . 
000gle'5 statement is misleading because, among other reasons, the reponed figure appears 
to include all of the impressions generated by Rosetta Stone's own Sponsored Links. 
Relying on the declaration of Thai Le, Google disputes Rosetta Stone's Undisputed Facts 40 
and 41, which evidence actual confusion, claiming that most of the complaints logged in 
Rosetta Stone's databases do not reference Google. (Opp'n at 16-17; Dkt 152, Le DecL j As 
explained in the dec laration of Jason Calhoun (Okt 106), the focus of Rosetta Stone's 
customer care representatives is on customer satisfaction - not determining whether the 
individual found the counterfeit sites through a Google Sponsored Link. (Calhoun Decl. 19.) 
Likewise, Rosetta Stone's web-based system is not designed to ask customers about 
confusion or to delermine if a search engine led the individual to the counterfeit site. ([d. ~ 
to.) The "graphical presentations" prepared by Me. Le are consistent with these facts. (See, 
e.g., Dkt. 152, Le Dec!. 113 (showing that 86% of the Pararure complaints logged between 
December 2009 and April 2010 had only general entries of "fraud" or "piracy").) 
10 
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Rosetta Stone, moreover, established that the remaining eight confusion fac.tois all 
strongly faver a flnding of confusion here. (Rosetta Stone Mem a'£ 21-24.) Google does not 
dispute that factors 1 (the strength of distinctiveness of the mark), 2 (the similarity of the [Wo 
marks), 3 (the slmiiarity of the goods and services that. the marks identify), 4 (the simllarity of 
the facilities tbat the two panies use in their businesses), 5 (the similarity 0 f the advertising the 
two parties usel and 8 (the quality of the defendant's product) aU favor a finding of confusion. 
Instead, Google argues [hat these factors are largely irrelevant and that the court should instead 
focus only on factors 6 (the defendant's intent.) and 9 (the sophistication of the consuming 
public). As discussed below, however, even were Google correct in its unsupported assertiun 
regarding the factors that are relevant to its practices, these factors also favor a fmding of 
confusion.9 
With respect to intent, Ooogle asserts that there is no "evidence in the record that Google 
intended to confuse potential purcbasers of Rosetta Stone's products," (Opp'n at 19.) GoogIe, 
however, intentionally entices its customers to bid oil the Rosetta Stone Marks and to use the 
Rosetta Stone Marks in Sponsored Link text because Google knows that branded keywords, such 
as trademarks, result in higher click- through rates than non-branded keywords 3nd that higher 
click-through rates equate to greater profits. (UF 30-33.l Google thus affirmatively - and 
intentionally - use::s the Rosena Stone Marks to drive internet traffic away from Rosetta Stone 
• Notably, the factors that Google claims are not relevant to the Court's assessment of 
likelihood of confusion are those that are necessarily admitted by Google's practices: 
Google uses the exact same marks on the exact same search-results p2ges to permit its 
customers to sell the exact same products. Rosetta Stone respectfully submits that the fact 
that the exact Rosetta Stone ~1arks are being used weighs strongly in favor of likeliliood of 
confusion, thereby rendering the other factors of less significance. See Brookfield Commc 'I1S 
v. West Coast Elllm'/, 174 F.3d 1036, 1056 (9th Cir. 1999) (where there is a "virtual identity 
of marks" used with the same type of product "likelihood of confusion would follow as a 
m2tter of course"). 
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and to the s ites of Google's customers. Google, moreover, certainly "intended to capitalize on 
the good ...... ' ill associated with" tht: Rosetta Stone Marks. CareFirSl all'vtd., 434 F.3d at 273. 
With respect [0 the sophistication of the consuming public, Google simp ly ignores the 
record evidence. Irrespective of the education and wea lch of Rosetta Stone custo mers, the 
undisputed facts demonstrate that even ",sophisticated" consumers are confused by Google' s 
SponslJred Links: Rosetta Stone deposed five college·educated consumers who were confused 
by Google's Sponsored Links, and Google 's own research demonstrates that search-engine users 
are unable to distinguish between Sponsored Links and organic results and are confused when 
tradernarks are used in the tex.t ofSponscred Links. 
C. The Functionality And First Sale Doctrines Have No Applicntion To Google's 
Practices 
Although Google does not characterize them as such in its opposition, it also relies on 
two of its affumative defenses in an attempt to avoid summary judgment. Neither defense 
provides a basis for denying Rosette Stone's motion. First, Google argues that "the use of 
trademarks 2.5 keywords is functional and therefore not actionable." (Opp'n at 13 .) The 
functionality doctrine, however, has no application to Google's sale of the Rosetta Stone Marks 
to third parties: 
The functionality doctrine prevents trademark law, which seeks to promote 
competition by protecting a fum's reputation. from instead inhibiting legitimate 
competition by allowing a producer to control a useful product feature. It is the 
province of patent law, not trademark law, to encourage invention by granting 
inventors a monopoly over new product designs or funct ions for a limited time, 35 
U.S .c. §§ 154,1 73, after which competitors are free to use the innovation. If the 
product's functional features could be used as trademarks, however, a monopOly 
over such features could be obtained without regard to whether they qualify as 
patents and could be extended forever (because trademarks may be renewed in 
perpetuity). 
12 
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Qualitex Co. v. Jacobson Prods. Co., Inc., 514 U.S. 159, 164-65 (1995) (green-geld color of 
press pads used in dry cleaning and laundry establishments was nO[ f..lI!ctional and m~t the basic 
legal requirements for use as a trademark). 
Thus, in TrafJu Devices, Inc. v, .~{arketing Disp!ays. /rIC. , Ihe Suprem<: Court concluded 
that the plaintiffs dual-spring design for road signs was functional- it provided a "unique and 
useful mechanism to resist the force of the wind" - and therefore was nor entitled to trade dress 
protection. 523 U.S. 23, 33-34 (2001). Likewise, inSega Enterprises Ltd. v. Accolade. Inc., the 
court found that an initialization code \-vas a functional feature that must be included in a video 
game program in order for me game tc operate on plaintiffs video game system and that 
defendant therefore could not be barred from using the code in manufacturing video games for 
plaintiff's video game system 977 F.2d \510; 1530-31 (9th Cir. 1993). Here, the Rosetta Stone 
Marks are not functional as they are not essential to the use or purpose of Rosetta Stone's 
products and they do not affect the cost or quality of those products. The functionDlity doctrine 
therefore is inapplicable. See Playboy Enters., 354- F.3d at 1031 (finding that function.lity 
doctrme has no application to defendant search engine operators' use of plaintiff's trademarks: 
"[t]he fact that the marks make defendallts' computer program more funcrionalis irrelevanC,):lo 
" In asserting that "(t]his Court has previously held that the mere use of trademarks as 
keywords is insufficient to establish liability," Google mischaracterizes Judge Brinkcma's 
opinion. Based on the faclual record before her, which consisted principally of an expert 
survey that she rejected in significant part, she found that the "plaintiff has failed to establish 
a likelihood of confusion stem.rning from Google's use ofG.EICO' s {radell'.ark as a keyword 
and., has not produced sufficient evidence to proceed On the question of whether the 
Sponsored Links that do not reference GEICO's marks in their headings or text create a 
sufficient likelihood of confusion to violate either the Lanham Act or Virginia common law." 
GEICO, 2005 WL 1903128, at *7. She did not hold that Google's sale of trademarks.s 
keywords is not actionable. 
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Googie's reliance on thl! 'Trrst sale doctrine" to justify its use of the Rosetta Stone Marks 
is equally misplaced. (Opp'n" 15-16.) That doctrine is based on the premise ,hat ", ... demark 
law does not apply to the sale of genuine goods bearing a true m.ark." Shell Oil Co. v. 
Commercial Petroleum, inc., 928 F.2d 104, 1'07 (4th Cit. i 991). Thus, "a purchaser who does no 
more than stock, display, and resell a producer's product under the producer's trademark violates 
no right conferred upon the producer by the Lanham ACL" Sebastian Im'L Inc. v. Longs D11lg 
Stores Corp., 53 F.3d 1073, 1076 (9th Cit. 1995). However, "conduct by the reseller other than 
merely stocking and reselling genuine trademarked products may he sufficient to support e. cause 
of action for infringement." Id. Here, Google and its customers do more than "stock, display, 
and resell" genuine Rosetta Stone product under the Rosetta Stone Marks. The first Side doctrine 
th~refore is inapplicable. 
Rosetta Stone bas proved direct trademark infringement. 
II. ROSETTA STOJli>: HAS PROVED SECONDARY TRADEMARK LIABILITY 
To prove contriburory infringement, Rosetta Stone must prove trot Google "intentionally 
induces another to infringe" or "continues to supply its product to one whom it knows or ha~ 
reason to know is engaging in trademark infringement." Inwood Labs., inc. v. Ives Labs., Inc. , 
456 U.S. 844, 854 (1982). To prove vicarious infringement, Rosetta Stone must prove that 
Google and its customers controlled the appearance ofth.e Sponsored Links on Google's search-
results pages and the use of Rosetta Stone's trademarks therein. GElCO, 330 F. Supp. 2d at 705 
The undisputed facts support liability on all ofthese bases. (Rosella Stone Mem. at 24-27.) 
The record evidence establishes that Google intentionally induces customers to bid on 
trademarked terms as keyword triggers and to use tradcJ!18rked terms in the text and title ofrheir 
Sponsored Links. (UF 30-33.) Google does not dispute these facts. COpp'n at 24-26.) Instead, 
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it asserts that it can.'1ot be held contributorily liable for the infringement of its customers because 
there is no evidence that Googte intended that its customers infringe the Rosetta Stone Marks. 
(Jd. at 24-26.) [n so arguing, Googlc hides behind the facial neutrality of its practices - asserting 
that because its too ts look to historical data and algorithmically predict search queries, it cannot 
be found to have "intentionally" mduced iiS customers to infringe. (ld. at 25.) But the record 
evidence sho\vs that (i) Google is aware of the infringing nature of Sponsored Li.ilks; and (ii) 
nevenheless recommends to ail its customers that they bid on trademarked terms as keyword 
triggers and use trademarked terms in Sponsored Link te..\."t. The fact that Google induces aU its 
customers to engage in such conduct does not relieve it from liability when certain of those 
customers in fact infringe. 
The record evidence also establishes that Google continued to sell the Rosetta Stone 
Marks as ke}'\\'ords to individuals who it knew or had reason to know were selling counterfeit 
Rosetta Stone goods. C[ Tiffany Illc. v. eBrI)'. Inc. , _ F.3d _, 2010 U.S. App. LEXIS 6735, at 
*41 (2d Cir. Apr. I, 2010). Specifically, the Callioun declaration demonstrates that during the 
'.:' 
period September 2009 to March 2010, Rosetta Stone repeatedly contacted Google to request 
thnt specific Sponsored Links be taken down on the basis that the sites to which Google was 
;:, 
directing traffic were selling counterfeit Rosetta Stone software. Bet\veen September 3, 2009 
and March 1,2010, Rosetta Stone notified Google of nearly 200 instances of Sponsored Links to 
counterfeit web sites. (Dk~. 106.) Attached to Mr. Callioun's declaration was a spreadsheet 
reflecting the dates upon which Rosetta Stone found a counterfeit Sponsored Link on Google, the 
dates upon whjch Rosetta Stone advised Google that the Sponsored Link was fraudulent, the 
'. domain names associated wilh each such Sponsored Link, the text of each such Sponsored Link, 
and the date and substance of Google 's response. ({ti) This spreadsheet demonstrates thRl 
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Google continued to auction the Rosetta Stone Marks to the same customers after Rosetta Stone 
had ad:,ised Goog!e that the customers were selling counterfeit product 
For example, on November 16, 2009, Rosetta Stone advised Google that 
gainsoftrnall.com/rosettastoneCc:lorado was infringing Ras'etta Stone's marks. (See Calhoun Ex. 
D-79.)" On that same day, Google advised Rosetta Stone that it had taken the infringing Link 
uown. (Id.l On November 17, 2009, however, Google again allowed 
gainsoftmallcornlrosectastoneColorado to place an infringing Sponsored Link on a search-results 
page fer a Rosetta Stone mark. (See id. Ex. D-7fi.) Rosetta Stone again advised Google of the 
infringing Sponsored Link and, on November 18, 2009, Google: advised Rosetta Stone that it had 
taken the infringing Link dow," (See iri) Then, on Noveruber 19, 2009, Google again allowed 
gainsofirnall.comfrosettastone to place an infringing Sponsored Link on a search-results page for 
a Rosetta Stone mark. (See id. Ex.. D-74.) These facts establish that Google was supplying its 
service to individuals who it knew were selling counterfeit Rosetta Stone goods. (See also Dkt. 
147. Rosert~ Stone Opp'n to GoogJe Mot. for Swn. Judg. at 21-24.> Because Google continued 
to supply its product to known infringers, Goagle is liable far contributory infringement. 12 
11 In shn..1' contrast to the specific notice provided by Rosetta Stone to Google, Tiffany 's 
demand letters to eBay "did not identify particular sellers who Tiffany thought were then 
offering or would offer counterfoit goods." Tiffany, 2010 U.S. App. LEYJS 6735, at ·41. 
11 Contrary to Google's assertion, Rosetta Stone· is not seeking to impose an affJ!Inative duty on 
Google to monitor and enforce its trademark rights. (Opp'n at 27 It 13.) Rosetta Stone seeks 
to preclude Google from selling the Rosetta Stone Marks to third parties. Nor would the 
relief Rosetta Stone seeks "render operation ofGooglc's website impossible.:' (Id. ) Rosetta 
Stone seeks only to revert back to Google's pre-2004 practices - when Google permitted 
trademark owners to object to the sale of their trademarks as keywords. In fact, as a result of 
its settlement of similar lawsuits brought by American Airlines and REfN1AX. Google 
currently does not pennit thu'd parties to bid on "American Airlines" or HRFJMAX" as 
. keywords. 
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Finally, the record evidence demonstrates that Google controls both the appearance 0 f the 
Sponsored Links that appear en its ~earch-;esuHs pages a.~d the use ofthe Rosetta Stone lvlarks 
in those Lin.l<s. (VF 29-33.) In response, Google argues only that it lacks an agency relationship 
with its cusrQI!'£rs and therefore cannot be h~ld liable far·the conduct of irs customers. (Opp'n at 
28.) In so arguing, Google teo narrowly construes vicarious infringement. Vicarious liability 
arises not only when an agency relationship exists bur also when the «defendant and the infri.nger 
'exercise joint ownership and control over (he infringing product ," GEICO, 330 F. Supp. 2d at 
705. Thus, Judge Brinkema denied Googte's motion to dismiss GEICO's vicarious infringement 
claim where GEICO aUeged thot Google controls the appearance of the Spcnsored Links that 
appear an its search-results pages and the use of GEICO's n1arks therein. Jd. Because these 
facts arc established here, Google is liable to Rosetta Stone for vicarious infringement as well 
Ill. ROSETTA STONE HAS PROVED TRADEMARK DILUTION 
To prove a dilution claL'll Rosetta Stone must demonstrate (t) that it owns a f3mous mark 
that is distinctive; (2) that Google has commenced using a mark in conunerce that allegedly is 
diluting Rosetta Stone's famous mark (3) that a similarity between Google 's mark and Rosetta 
Stone's fa mous mark gives rise to an association between the marles; and (4) [hat the association 
is likely to impair the distinctiveness of the famous mark or likely to harm the reputation of the 
famous mark. LOllis Vuitton Malietier SA. v. Haute Diggity Dog, UC, 507 F.3d 252, 264-65 
(4th Cir. 2007); see also 15 V.S.c. § 1125(c)(I) (2006). Rosetta Stone has established these 
dements. (Rosetta Stone Mem. at 27-29.) 
Relying exclusively on the Second Circuit's recent decision in the Tiffany y. eBay case, 
Google argues that it cannot be held liable for dilution because it "does nor use Rosetta Stone's 
marks (0 identify Google's own goods and services." . (Opp'n at 28.) Unlike eBay, however, 
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Google in fact uses the Rosetta Stone Marks. It seils the Mark.; themselves to third parties and 
displays Sponsored Links on search-re~ult pages when a user quuies a Rosetta Stone Mark. 
Google thus engag~s in conduct that both blurs and tarnishes the RoseGa Stone Marks. In this 
regard, courts routinely have found dilution by blurring where, as here, the defendant has used 
the plaintiff's actual mark. See, e.g., . Diane von Furstenberg Studio \/. Snyder, ).fo. 
1:06cv1356(JCC), 2007 WL 2688184, at "4 CE.D. Va. Sept. 10, 2007) (granting pl'intiff 
summary judgment on its dilution claim where the defendant used the identical mark); PETA v. 
Doughney, 113 F. Supp. 2d 915, 920 (E.D. Va. 2000), a!J'd, 263 F.3d 359 (4th Cir. 2001) (same). 
Likewise, courts routinely have found dilution by tamishmenr where, as here, the plaintiffs mnrk 
has been linked to counterfeit products. See, e.g., Diane von Furstenberg Studio: 2007 WI. 
2688 184, at '4 (fmding tarnishment); Am. Oniine, Inc. v. LeGM, Il1c., 46 F. Supp. 2d 444, 450 
(ED. Va. 1998) (finding tamisiunent). For these reasons, Rosetta Stone is entitled to SUl1Ullary 
judgment on its trademark dil~tion claim. l ) 
IV. ROSETTA STONE HAS PROVED UNJUST ENRICHMENT 
Under Virginia law, a plaintiff seeking recovery foc unjust enricni·nent must show that (1) 
~ "conferred" a benefit on the defendant, (2) the defendant knew of the benefit and sholl id 
reasonably have expected to repay the plaintiff, and (3) the defendant accepted or retained the 
benefit without paying for its vaiue. Nossen v. Hoy, 750 F. Supp. 740, 744-45 (E.D. Va. 1990). 
Judge Davis recently explained that the word .... conferred" in this context includes situations in 
!j Google's assertion .that Rosetta Stone cannot show that its marks were famous by May of 
2004 is factually and legally baseless. As a fuetua l malter, "Rosetta Stone" was a famous 
mark in 2004. 'CSee Rosetta Stone Mem. at 27-29 & UF 1-4 & 8.) As a legal maner, this case 
does not involve a situation where the defendant is usiug a mark similar to the plaintiffs 
mark on its 0\.1-71 goods. Rather. this case involves Google's sale of the Rosetta Stone Marks 
themselves. Given that Google uses the Rosetta Stone Marks because they are famous, its 
attempt to avoid liability based on the date the MarkS became famous is untenable. 
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which the defendant, without authorization, takes a benefit from the plaintiff even when the 
plaintiff ha.s not voluntarily bestowed the benefit on the defendant. See In re Bay Vista of Va .. 
Ene., No. 2:09cv46, 2009 WL 2900040, at *5 (E.D. Va. June 2, 2009). 
GoogJe argues that it has not been unjustly enriched because it "has not ~taken' any 
benefit from Rosetta Stone." (Opp'n at 29.) Specifically, Google asserts that because "[a] 
trademark owner has no property right i..."1 its mark beyond the right to prevent consumer 
confusion as to source of its goods," it cannol have taken a benefit from Rosetta Stone unless its 
actkms violate Rosetta SlOne's trademark rights. (ld. at 29-30. ) The cases cited by Google, 
however, directly contradict its assertion as both make clear that a mark owner possesses 
goodwill in its marks. See Presrollettes, inc. v. Coty, 264 U.S. 359, 368 (1924) ("A trade-mark 
cnly gives the right iO prohibit the use of it sofaI' as to prori!t:llhe owner's good will against Ihe 
sale of another's product as his.") (emphasis added); United Drug Co. v. Theodore Reclanus Co., 
248 U.S. 90, 97 (1918) (trademark law's "function is simply to designate the goods as the 
product of a particular trader and (0 protect hi'i good will 3gamst the sale of another's product 2S 
his; and it is not the subject of property except in connection with an existing business") 
(emphasis added); see also George & Co., 575 FJd at 392-93 (recognizing that a trademark 
protects " the goodwill represented by parricular marks"). Here, Google has taken the goodwill in 
the Rosetta Stone Marks and sold it to third parties for Google's own benefit. It thus has taken a 
benefit from Rosetta Stone. 
Google also argues that it is entitled to sununary jud~ment because there is no record 
evidence that Goog1e promised to pay for the use of the Rosetta Stone Marks. (Opp'n at 30.) 
The promise to pay, however, "is im~lied from the consideration received:' Appleton v. 
BOl1durant & Appleton. P.c., 67 Va. Cir. 95, 2005 .\VL 517491, at +6 (Va. Cir. Ct. 2005) 
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(citations-omitted); see aiso Po River Water and Sewer Co. v. Indian Acres Club of Thornburg, 
Inc., 255 Va. 108, ! 14-15 (1998). Here, the undisputed facts demonstrate that Google took 
without authorization the Rosetta. Stone Marks and made them available to twd parties at 
auctions hosted by Google. It also is undisputed that Google derived considerable profits from 
the unauthorized auction of the Rosetta Smne Marks. The promise to pay for ltJjs benefit is 
implied iIllaw from the unaUlhorized taking and subsequent sale of the Rosetta Stone Marks. 
CONCLUSION 
Rosetta Stone's. motion for partial summary judgment should be granted. 
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